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JOAN B. KROC INSTITUTE FOR PEACE & JUSTICE
The mission of the Joan B.
Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice
(IPJ) is to foster peace, cultivate
justice, and create a safer world.
Through education, research, and
peacemaking activities, the IPJ
offers programs that advance
scholarship and practice in conflict
resolution and human rights. The
Institute for Peace & Justice,
located at the University of San
Diego, draws upon Catholic social
teaching that sees peace as
inseparable from justice and acts to
prevent and resolve conflicts that
threaten local, national, and
international peace. The IPJ was established in 2000 through a generous gift
from the late Joan B. Kroc to the University of San Diego to create an institute
for the study and practice of peace and justice. Programming began in early
2001 and the building was dedicated in December 2001 with a conference,
“Peacemaking with Justice: Policy for the 21st Century.”
The Institute for Peace & Justice strives, in Joan B. Kroc’s words, to “not
only talk about peace, but to make peace.” The IPJ offers its services to parties
in conflict to provide mediation and facilitation, assessments, training, and
consultations. It advances peace with justice through work with members of
civil society in zones of conflict and has a focus on mainstreaming women in
peace processes.
The Women PeaceMakers Program brings into residence at the IPJ
women who have been actively engaged in peacemaking in conflict areas
around the world to document their stories, share experiences with others
working in peacemaking, and allow time for reflection on their work.
A Master’s Program in Peace & Justice Studies trains future leaders in the
field and will be expanded into the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies,
supported by a $50 million endowment from the estate of Mrs. Kroc.
WorldLink, a year-round educational program for high school students
from San Diego and Baja California connects youth to global affairs.
Country programs, such as the Nepal project, offer wide-ranging conflict
assessments, mediation, and conflict resolution training workshops.
Community outreach includes speakers, films, art, and opportunities for
discussion between community members, academics, and practitioners on issues
of peace and social justice, as well as dialogue with national and international
leaders in government, non-governmental organizations, and the military.
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Endowed in 2003 by a generous gift to the Joan B. Kroc Institute for
Peace & Justice from the late Joan Kroc, philanthropist and international peace
proponent, the Joan B. Kroc Distinguished Lecture Series is a forum for high-
level national and international leaders and policy makers to share their
knowledge and perspectives on issues related to peace and justice. The goal of
the series is to deepen understanding of how to prevent and resolve conflict
and promote peace with justice.
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opportunity to engage with leaders who are working to forge new dialogues
with parties in conflict and who seek to answer the question of how to create
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developments in the search for effective tools to prevent and resolve conflict
while protecting human rights and ensuring social justice.
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE SERIES SPEAKERS
May 8, 2003 Helen Caldicott, M.D.
President, Nuclear Policy Research Institute
The New Nuclear Danger
April 15, 2003 Robert Edgar, Ph.D.
General Secretary, The National Council of Churches
The Role of the Church in U.S. Foreign Policy
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Conflict, Gender, and Human Rights: Lessons Learned 
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ANTHONY C. ZINNI, USMC (RETIRED)
General Zinni joined the Marine Corps in 1961 and was commissioned
an infantry second lieutenant in 1965 upon graduation from Villanova
University. He has held numerous command and staff assignments that
include platoon, company, battalion, regimental, Marine expeditionary unit,
and Marine expeditionary force command. His staff assignments included
service in operations, training, special operations, counter-terrorism, and
manpower billets. He has also been a tactics and operations instructor at
several Marine Corps schools and was selected as a fellow on the Chief of
Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group. General Zinni’s joint assignments
include command of a joint task force and a unified command. He has also
had several joint and combined staff billets at task force and unified
command levels.
General Zinni has made deployments to the Mediterranean, the
Caribbean, the Western Pacific, Northern Europe and Korea. He has also
served tours in Okinawa and Germany. His operational experiences include
two tours in Vietnam, emergency relief and security operations in the
Philippines, Operation Provide Comfort in Turkey and northern Iraq,
Operation Provide Hope in the former Soviet Union, Operations Restore
Hope, Continue Hope, and United Shield in Somalia, Operations Resolute
Response and Noble Response in Kenya, Operations Desert Thunder, Desert
Fox, Desert Viper, Desert Spring, Southern Watch and the Maritime
Intercept Operations in the Persian Gulf, and Operation Infinite Reach
against terrorist targets in the Central Region. He was involved in the
planning and execution of Operation Proven Force and Operation Patriot
Defender in support of the Gulf War and noncombatant evacuation
operations in Liberia, Zaire, Sierra Leone, and Eritrea. He has also
participated in presidential diplomatic missions to Somalia, Pakistan, and
Ethiopia-Eritrea, and State Department missions involving the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and conflicts in Indonesia.
General Zinni has attended numerous military schools and courses
including the National War College. He holds a bachelor’s degree in
economics, a master’s in international relations, a master’s in management and
supervision, and honorary doctorates from William and Mary College and
the Maine Maritime Academy.
General Zinni’s awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal
with oak leaf cluster; the Distinguished Service Medal; the Defense Superior
Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters; the Bronze Star with Combat “V”
and gold star; the Purple Heart; the Meritorious Service Medal with gold
star; the Navy Commendation Medal with Combat “V” and gold star; the
Navy Achievement Medal with gold star; the Combat Action Ribbon; and
personal decorations from South Vietnam, France, Italy, Egypt, Kuwait,
Yemen, and Bahrain. He also holds 36 unit, service, and campaign awards.
His civilian awards include the Papal Gold Cross of Honor, the Union
League’s Abraham Lincoln Award, the Italic Studies Institute’s Global Peace
Award, the Distinguished Sea Service Award from the Naval Order of the
United States, the Eisenhower Distinguished Service Award from the
Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Chapman Award from the Marine Corps
University Foundation, the Penn Club Award, and the St. Thomas of
Villanova Alumni Medal.
the same war that I saw. War became something very important to me—this
whole idea of understanding different cultures and conflicts and what we
needed to do. At the same time, within the Marine Corps, Army and all the
services, we were undergoing our own cultural problems. We had the racial
issues, the drug issues, the generational issues. We had to struggle through all
those and adapt to the new all-volunteer force. There was almost an internal-
cultural thing going on. The nature of the Marine Corps allows you to travel
all over the world and expose yourself to many cultures and I was always
fascinated by them.
I had a fascination with trying to solve problems. I always was fortunate
enough to have bosses who gave me that opportunity. When I was in the
European command and issues or problems came up in Eastern Europe or
somewhere, General Jack Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and
General Jim McCarthy, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the European
Command, would send me off saying, “Go figure out what to do.”
These were the only instructions—I loved that. Back from my time in
Vietnam, I liked the ops [operations] where you are off on your own with
really difficult complex problems that you have to unravel or solve. Some you
do and some you don’t, but you try to understand why you didn’t.
JN: When you talk about problem solving—did you put things together
as a kid?
Z: I did. I made a lot of models as a kid. I collected all sorts of things. My
mother and father were immigrants; they came with my grandmother and
grandfather from the same place in Italy. My father only had a third grade
education. He worked for a very wealthy family on the Main Line in
Philadelphia. He was a chauffer, a caretaker of property, and he really believed
strongly in education. He believed that we needed to read. This very wealthy
family subscribed to every magazine known to mankind: Newsweek, Time,
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INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL
ANTHONY C. ZINNI, USMC (RETIRED)
The following is an edited transcript of an interview with General Anthony
C. Zinni, USMC (retired) by Major Stanton Coerr, US Marine Corps
Reserve, Dr. Joyce Neu, Executive Director of the Joan B. Kroc Institute for
Peace & Justice, and Dr. Randy Willoughby, USD Associate Professor of
Political Science, that took place at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace &
Justice on April 15, 2003.
Z = General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (retired)
SC = Major Stanton Coerr
JN = Dr. Joyce Neu
RW = Dr. Randy Willoughby
JN: General Zinni, what influenced your decision to pursue a military career?
Z: Vietnam. As a fresh new second lieutenant, I joined the Marine Corps
because it seemed like something neat to do after college. I wasn’t ready to go
into business yet; I just wanted to go off and have an adventure for a few years.
When I joined the Marine Corps at 18 years old, Vietnam was an issue and
by the time I graduated and went to Quantico, Vietnam started up. During my
first tour as a second lieutenant I was sent to a language school and then an
Army special worker’s tour where they trained special advisors. This prepared
me to be sent over with the Vietnamese Marines. We wore their uniforms,
spoke their language, and lived in their villages. I had very little contact with
Americans and got really caught up in the Vietnamese culture. What struck me
when I got back was that I had seen a different war than my fellow Marines. I
saw the war from the eyes of the Vietnamese people.
It struck me that we, the United States, missed understanding the conflict
because there were few people who understood the war from their perspective.
Certainly my colleagues, U. S. units fighting in a very isolated way, didn’t see
Collier’s, Look, U. S. News and World Report. So every week my father would come
home with a stack—he wanted us to read all these things. When I was a little
kid I was caught up in reading all these magazines. Of course any book that
they were through with, he would bring home. We always had a house full of
books, periodicals, and newspapers and he would encourage us all to make
sure we read and understood them. He always felt that our family, maybe more
than other families in our situation, was aware of what was going on.
JN: And the problem-solving stuff ?
Z: I don’t know where that came from. I’m not a mechanic. I like interaction with
people and trying to solve big problems by people interacting with each other.
RW: Your assignment in Vietnam, living in a Vietnamese village, speaking
the language, isn’t that an unusual assignment for a young Marine? Isn’t
that what the Green Berets do?
Z: The Vietnamese had a small Marine Corps and we had advisors there. But
it was unusual in that I was the only second lieutenant ever assigned there.
Normally more senior officers, like senior captains, are chosen because,
obviously, if you’re going to be giving advice you’d better know a little bit more
about what you are doing. They were surprised to see a second lieutenant show
up. I was assigned there because we were out of officers and they needed
replacements for some sick and wounded advisors. They were at the end of the
alphabet when they were assigning people to do this.
RW: Of all the books about Vietnam, are there any that you consider
particularly good?
Z: I don’t know if you remember Lieutenant Colonel William Corson. He
wrote a book about Vietnam, The Betrayal, about why we were approaching
this all wrong. It was a big issue.1 Here was a lieutenant colonel, very
outspoken, who had served down in Saigon and Bac Vie, and it was a very
powerful book. He described things in an amazing way.
I recall one chapter called “Westie’s Aviary.” This chapter described all the
people around Westmoreland, the birds of all different colors we called
“Westie’s Aviary.” In those days, people like John Paul Vann were beginning to
see that the approach to this situation was wrong; the strategy was wrong.
Many of the military decisions, like one-year individual rotations and not
mobilizing the reserves, were flawed. There were many mistakes made. It was
apparent from the ground, too. For us, it seemed to me, it wasn’t just about
defeating the Viet Cong. It was also about bringing something the South
Vietnamese were willing to fight for.
The same thing is happening in Iraq. If we give the Iraqis something to fight
for, our control and occupation and dealing with security issues should be
diminishing just as theirs is kicking into high gear. But the underpinning is not
just security issues or creating more jobs, it’s something that they want to fight
for and that means something. I look at the governing council in Baghdad who
hold a coup every month. The Vietnamese Marines had a coup force where
they would go into Saigon and decide who was going to be the next general
and who was going to be to be the next president. It was ridiculous. You could
see it wasn’t going to hold up.
We, as civil society, were leading ourselves to believe that we were providing
democracy, freedom. They [the Vietnamese] didn’t see it. They saw a
bankrupt system in Saigon that didn’t make them better off. The South
Vietnamese would have slightly preferred the South over the North for
slightly different reasons, that’s politics. But after a while it wasn’t worth
dying for and they were caught in between. And a lot of young Americans
couldn’t understand. “We are here dying for you, and you don’t care.” But you
have to look at it from the Vietnamese point of view. “What is the U.S.
leaving us with and is it any better than before?” When America gets involved,
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1 See Related Resources..
the expectations soar. I think the problem there and in Iraq is that when we
got involved, the expectations were really high. We should have done a lot
more to lower those expectations.
RW: Before we ask more questions about Iraq, could we talk about some of
the other places you have served since Vietnam, like Okinawa? Chalmers
Johnson, an Asian studies scholar now living here in San Diego, has become
one of the leading critics of American imperialism after an early career
that included defending the war in Vietnam. One of the lightning rods of
his book that appeared a few years ago, Blowback, is Okinawa.2 Do you have
any feelings about how we have managed our military presence there?
Z: I think Okinawa is unique. The Okinawans are not ethnically Japanese;
they are a mix of Polynesian and Chinese. They were an independent kingdom
known as a nonviolent people, commercial traders, gentle people. Most
Westerners commented that they couldn’t believe that there was a place on
earth without any prisons, jails, or weapons. The Chinese wanted to stay
isolated and wanted to use Okinawa as a trading center. Okinawans could face
the outside world, so the Chinese had a nice set-up.
The Japanese decided they wanted to grab Okinawa for the trade but they still
needed the Chinese to remain in the country. So Okinawa was very quietly
invaded, taken over, and the people were instructed not to tell the Chinese that
they were secretly under the control of the Japanese.
The Okinawan relationship with the Japanese has always been poor. The
Japanese always viewed the country something like the Puerto Rico of Japan.
It didn’t get much support and was always considered to be inferior. I think
the Japanese decided during the war that the Americans would not think of
invading the homelands at the sacrifice of the Okinawans—50,000
Okinawans and innocent civilians were killed during the battle. And then the
United States came in and occupied Okinawa. They were sort of victims in all
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this. Forty percent of Okinawans came back and they lost their cultural
identities. It became a camp town. In a similar way, it was very sad when I
returned to Vietnam and saw that their culture had disintegrated. Seeing the
American occupation govern there was really tragic.
When the U.S. decided to leave Okinawa, we only offered two alternatives to
the population. They could either remain under U.S. occupation or be under
Japanese control. A third option was independence, which they felt they had a
right to assert, their historical legitimacy, and we wouldn’t give them that
opportunity. Of the two, they chose the Japanese. Their logic: “Better the devil
you know. We’ve lived with the Japanese for years and this American
occupation isn’t working out,” so they chose the Japanese.
We stayed of course. It was in our interest to have a base in the Pacific to deal
with the Chinese threat so we packed into Okinawa. It also prevented the Japanese
from re-arming and getting weapons of mass destruction. The Japanese wanted
our forces there on the mainland and now the Okinawans were not only under
U.S. occupation but with a U.S. presence that was overwhelming. I think that was
unfortunate until prosperity started. Obviously, in the boom days of Japan they
started to put some money down and it started to pay off for the Okinawans who
put up with the Americans. Okinawans no longer had to have bars and put up
with everything else. In their own right things seemed to be improving and they
regained some culture. I commanded a regiment there in the mid-1980s in a camp
and I interacted with the local community in town. I would meet with the local
leadership, with the local assembly, and the leaders. It was interesting because I felt
that we had destroyed their culture and it was able to reemerge. Now, at the end
of the Cold War, I think they feel very strongly about minimizing our presence.
Currently, I feel the value of training in Okinawa is limited. I think Okinawa
is necessary as a logistics base in case conflict arises in Korea. I think we could
keep logistics units, stocks, and storage, maybe even an air base there in
Kadena. Those don’t create much of a strain on Okinawans. But for ground
units, like the Marines and the larger ground units, we ought to look
somewhere else in the Pacific, like Australia.2 See Related Resources..
RW: Could you translate in numbers of troops?
Z: I think we have about 35,000 troops there. That could probably be
reduced to a third—but it would not be a visible third. Troop numbers are
what upset the Okinawans the most, while the land issue is not a great problem
because many of the original landowners are now collecting rent or leasing
and, because it’s beginning to get a bit crowded, some of the bases and training
could be turned over. What the Okinawans take issue with is shooting
weapons and maneuvering; all that is involved in training. By maintaining only
the logistics, my guess would be roughly a third of current U.S. forces would
remain but they would not be involved in the kinds of activities that are
unacceptable to the Okinawans.
I think the problem has been where do we go from Okinawa? I think
expanding in South Korea is an option; the two previous governments in South
Korea have been interested in that possibility. There has even been talk about
Vietnam and the Vietnamese were interested in having a U.S. troop presence.
General [Charles C.] Krulak looked at Australia very seriously, which probably
wouldn’t be hard to do, although I think it would be useful mostly as a training
area, maybe as a rotational training area. I wouldn’t do any major military
construction or build up there because it is too far from the area that we are
mostly concerned about—the Koreas, Taiwan, and Japan.
RW: Speaking of forces and numbers, let’s talk about the force mix in Iraq.
There is an international mix, of course, and within the American
deployment we have not only active duty but an enormous number of
reserves and private contractors. Could you talk about some of the issues
regarding this particular force composition, especially the very heavy
reliance on Reserves? 
Z: I think we are overly reliant on the Reserves. I think that insofar as the
Reserves feel like they are a vital part of the force, that is good, but we should be
able to operate effectively with our active forces. An example of what’s happened
over time is that the Army has put a lot of their logistics in the Reserves, so they
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almost can’t do anything without a Reserve following. In addition to that, I believe
we have abused the Guarded Reserve. People are focused on the Guarded Reserve
now for this Iraq War, this war on terrorism, but long before that, in the
containment of Iraq and Iran, we had Guarded Reserve units pulling rotations.
When I first took over Central Command, I found that we had some ground
Reserve units. An infantry company was protecting our base with, I think, a
Guard unit. We had some sort of air traffic control unit from the Reserves.
When I went out there, I was impressed by these people. I asked my staff to
give me a list of all the Guard units who were doing this, who had served since
the Gulf War, because I wanted to write a letter to their senators, governor,
and employers to thank them. I had a stack of letters like this [indicates large
number]. I couldn’t believe it.
I wanted to visit some of these Guard units. I went to New Jersey and I talked
to leadership in the local community and what I heard was, “Look, if you need
us then we are ready to go but you can’t call us two, three, four times. We can
do it once, maybe twice in a stretch, but we can’t be like the active force.” By
relying so heavily on the Reserves, you are hurting the community. Many are
local police or firemen. It hurts the local businesses trying to support them.
Employers don’t want to fire them or give their jobs to somebody else, but they
have to get things done. Families suffer because they have to go on half-pay
once they are activated. It is something they are willing to sacrifice for once, but
they didn’t know that they were going to be treated just like active forces.
I also think that we contract out too much. Our intent was to get people
specifically for security, but more than night watchmen. Suddenly, organizations
popped up that hired former servicemen and women to fill the need. They had
a little more “oomph” to them, but they were competent. We contracted with
Vinell and Dime Corp. and every one of their employees were former Army and
Marine NCOs [non-commissioned officers]. We used their services in the
Persian Gulf to protect our pre-position sites. You’d go out and they had an
unusual uniform and they would salute and they ran things very well. It was very
cost-effective and they were very professional and they did a great job.
But they got carried away when we had 20,000 contractors in Iraq. They were
not a coherent group. They were this disparate collection and there wasn’t
control over them. Their interface with the military is uncertain. In the Falluja
incident, they weren’t supposed to drive through the center of town. They were
supposed to go around the town. Why, in Falluja, the hotbed of this militant
resistance (even the military was standing off from it) did four lightly-armed
civilians drive through the center of town in a commercial vehicle? I think that
got people’s attention. It is cost-effective, but we took a good idea and ran too
far with it.
JN: Earlier this week, Robert Perito of the U.S. Institute of Peace spoke
here at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice. He is a former career
Foreign Service officer who has written a book about post-conflict stability
forces and he says that we are the only country to subcontract these tasks.
Z: The Brits do it. When we did Aceh [Indonesia] with HDC [Henry
Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue], we hired contractors to do the
implementation and the monitoring. There’s a British company called Blue
Scot that does that kind of work too. In that case we didn’t use them for
security per se. We brought them on to do the monitoring of agreements.
These are all former military British SAS [Special Air Service] and Marine
commandos. For our mission, they used more senior officers because of the
monitoring role. Some had NATO experience and peacekeeping experience,
that sort of thing.
JN: Perito was talking about the fact that you put these people in unstable
post-conflict situations for policing but, as you just said, they are not a
unit, they are not cohesive, they are not trained together and they are
immune to prosecution.
Z: It’s a question of what happens when the transition occurs. We don’t have
a standard SOPA [Standard Operating Procedure Agreement] with Iraq. Some
other countries out in the Gulf don’t have one. We just seem to agree to
disagree. We all know that if something happens we’ll get the guilty party out
of there before they have to be subject to their laws. What happens if one of
them, in a drunken fit, uses a weapon and kills an Iraqi, and the Iraqi police
arrest him? It would be an interesting situation. It’s a small issue, but these
situations haven’t been thought through in this transition. I’m not sure what
these subcontractors are subject to in terms of rules of engagement and that
type of thing. Sometimes they are over-trained. When just basic security is
needed in a situation and former high-ranking Special Forces NCOs are used,
it is excessive. I’d rather have some former military policemen doing basic
security police function. There are some organizations that I really respect and
trust and others that are a little bit loose and worry military leadership.
SC: In December of 2002, right before the ramp-up for Iraq, you gave a
speech at Quantico saying, “This is the wrong war at the wrong time.” If
you were in command, what would you do from here out? 
Z: I would do a number of things. First thing I would do is mend fences and
strained relationships with friends in the region. Even our closest allies
complain that there has been no consultation. I wasn’t surprised the other
night when the President said that he was going to send Rich Armitage
[Deputy Secretary of State] to tell them something. Send him out to ask them
something. And now, with the announcement on the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process, our stock dropped even lower. We’ve got to go out there and engage
the region. Most countries in the region are not going to be able to participate
actively in Iraq, but I do believe that they can help us on the margin. They have
contacts in Iraq and they know the cultures. I think you can build training
camps for Iraqi security forces in some of our neighboring countries and they
could work with the Iraqis. I think quietly you could ask countries to send in
a handful of people to serve as advisors to our units. If I were a Marine
Battalion Commander or Regimental Commander, it would be great to have
three or four Kuwaiti or Bahraini officers who speak the language, know the
culture and can give advice when the Marine Corps command staff comes.
Second, I would talk to the permanent members of the Security Council and
to Kofi Annan about what it would take to get a UN [United Nations]
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resolution and authority. Bite the bullet about their involvement with the
political reconstruction and the economic reconstruction; that’s what it’s going
to take. I would say that we could use their help in border security in places
that are not casualty intensive but are important.
I would hold an exposition for Iraqi business and development in Amman,
Jordan. I would bring in Iraqi businessmen and ask, “What do you need in the
way of promoting security? How many jobs can you produce?”
I would try to bring in investors by going to the UN and allowing them to
participate in the economic development. This would be encouraging to
French businessmen, Saudi businessmen, American businessmen. I was
surprised by the amount of the investment that’s waiting out there to be
committed to Iraq and the number of Iraqi businessmen who want to move on
it but are unable to get it together.
You need to get jobs. I would look at these contractors, Halliburton, Kellogg,
Brown and Root, and others, and push them to hire Iraqis as opposed to ex-
patriots or foreigners. It doesn’t take a genius to drive a truck. Why are we
paying $120,000 for someone to drive a truck as unemployed Iraqis stand by
and watch? I would try to get as many Iraqi security forces on the street as soon
as possible, even if they aren’t fully trained, but begin a training cycle. We’re
going to experience some problems, like the forces not standing up to the fight,
or melting away, or not feeding them very well, but constantly re-train them. I
would get their officers and leadership well-trained and put their advisor cadre
with them. But instead we’re waiting for the perfect unit and putting them out
too slowly. We made a mistake by disbanding the standing army, but we need
to put their security forces on the street and train them as we go.
I think in the political process we’ve got it backwards. We want to turn over
authority and push the elections, but they need to sit down and come to a
conclusion or be pushed towards a federation so we don’t continue to belabor
this issue of whether the system will be proportional representation or one man,
one vote. Then we have to work hard to help them develop rival political parties.
They are developing these political parties on their own, but it’s kind of shady,
especially the way some of the exiles are operating. We really need to have a
transparent, open, internationally supported effort to create political parties. If
not, it could end up like Pakistan with a bunch of corrupt political parties. Next,
we need to begin the process of educating the electorate. The electorate receives
its guidance from the pulpit at Friday prayers; there’s no alternative to that. This
whole idea of educating the electorate has to become more formalized.
I would use the U.S. military as a major reaction force for the major problems.
I would pull our soldiers out of street patrolling unless it was absolutely
necessary for security. I would push the Iraqi security forces out there. I would
work with the outfits that still have militias and work to disband them. Some
militias could be combined into a larger force, but don’t confront them unless
they do something unacceptable. You could bet the Shi’ia have formed militias
and pretty soon the Sunni will form them, too. Ex-Fedayeen and Republican
guard will have to be integrated or confronted in some way.
I also would go through at this point [and begin] a reconciliation process, very
formally. I would have an open trial for Saddam [Hussein] and make it last for
a year, where everybody could come and pour out their hearts about everything
he’s done. It needs to be done. It’s an experience that they need to go through
to get it out. At the same time I would try something like South Africa has
with the Truth and Reconciliation Committee to encourage reconciliation so
the country can move on.
JN: Your perspective on what’s needed comes from your experience on the
ground. Many of our political leaders have been on the ground as well, for
an hour or two. You’ve just given an entire framework for the exit from
conflict and entry into a post-conflict phase in Iraq. To what extent do
military officers, like yourself, have input into the policy process?
Z: Not much. I think the closest we came was during the Clinton
Administration. I was asked by Senator [John] McCain if I ever made any
policy proposals to my bosses and I told him no. But I had. It was not that I
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world? Why are things like that?” And I got some bored looks. One of the
most senior and important guys said to me later, “They don’t care about that.”
Let me give you an example of this. I think it was Duncan Hunter who said
“Buy American.” That sounds good, but what president or legislature is going
to say “Buy American?” When we insisted that our military buy American
there were some problems with that. Sometimes you don’t get the best
equipment, believe it or not. Sometimes there’s a company overseas that
produces a better, more cost-effective result.
Second problem, a British company comes over and Tony Blair comes to our
President and says, “We backed you one-hundred percent and supplied troops
and we are blocked from competing. All I am saying is that if you are going to
buy something, allow my companies to show you what they have to see if it’s
quality or not.” We isolate allies a lot of times. What appears to be a good
idea is not a good idea. Plus, we could kill markets for our own businesses.
The way decisions are made in Washington does not reflect what is going on
in the field. Very little input from the field makes it up there. If I am Donald
Rumsfeld and I am about to launch into this mission, Iraq, and suddenly I have
a great number of retired generals, very high ranks, saying that I am about to
make a big mistake I don’t have to, Democrats and Republicans, I would at
least hear them out. I would have a breakfast at the Federal Building and bring
in all the generals to hear their concerns and answer their concerns.
What happened is that they turned on us and ran personal attacks. That was
Rumsfeld’s mechanism. Ours were voiced concerns, they weren’t put out as
attacks and they weren’t politically motivated. They never were followed through.
If the last set of commanders, going back God knows how far, thought that this
was going to be a mistake, I would sure like to hear what they were going to say.
I would sure like to hear from my staff. That’s a real consideration.
JN: Some of us who aren’t in the governmental sector or the military
sector, and I’m speaking for myself, feel that our current political leaders
are willing to commit our military to engagements that may not be, in
fact, defensive, may be, in fact, aggressive. Secretary of State Madeleine
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was trying to lie to him, just that the proposals were never heard. I thought, in
my time, the sanctions in Iraq were dead. They were mismanaged, Saddam had
manipulated them. It was creating problems in the region. I thought we
shouldn’t lift all economic sanctions, just military sanctions. If we were to have
sanctions, the UN should have an Arab organization formed to administer
them. So in the Arab world, when they complained that the U.S. was punishing
them, they would see that it was Arab administered—it would be transparent.
I made a six-point recommendation for this. I was listened to off and on. So
were military people on the ground. It depends on the education you have, but
you are not really listened too.
The problem that struck me in this business is that policy is made in
Washington by a group of elites in Washington with a standard career pattern.
They go from academia, to think-tanks, to government. They make their
rounds to the intelligence services, talking heads you see on every news
network, the so-called experts. They all have their own pet strategic plans they
are trying to assert because it’s good recognition. It moves them along. In most
cases they really believe in it. It’s developed in a nice air-conditioned office on
K Street. They do touch-and-go’s in the region at best. They don’t have the
experience but when it comes time to quote their ideas (their ideas have appeal
because they are one or two pages), for a president like this it’s very nice and
neat, black and white and very clear. They don’t reflect the complexity and
reality of what’s happening.
The other impact is the Early Bird syndrome [the Current News Early Bird is
a Defense Department summary of military news stories from media around
the world]. I see senior officers passionately waiting for that Early Bird to
arrive in the morning. I used to tell my staff from Central Command that I
knew all the questions that were going to be coming from Washington that
morning. You read the Early Bird; you’ll know what the questions are.
Everything was done through that medium.
I remember giving testimony in front of the House Appropriations
Committee and asking them “Why are things like that in my region of the
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RW: In Vietnam, was there anyone?
Z: General David Shoup, Commandant in the Marine Corps. As Vietnam
was starting up, his tenure was coming up and he voiced his concerns, that this
was the wrong war, the wrong way, that the domino theory was mistaken. He
recognized the difficulty of fighting a ground war in Asia. They isolated him.
At one point in time, he became ostracized, and they couldn’t do it the way
they wanted to because he was a Medal of Honor recipient in World War II.
So there’s this revered chief of service (unlike Shinseki, Shoup had the Medal
of Honor around him), plus he was a character, smoked cigars, played poker.
He came from retirement, too. Johnson’s idea was to co-opt him. Get him on
a plane, send him to Vietnam, show him around, and show him all the good
things. Shoup told him to “Go to hell.”
I can remember at that time we respected him but we thought maybe he has
this wrong. We treated him with great respect but treated him, in the ranks,
like he didn’t know what was going on. Of course, we later realized that he was
right all along. We come back to the [General Douglas] MacArthur problem;
he thought he was more powerful than the president. That view couldn’t be
maintained.
SC: You used the phrase “Gucci Generals” to describe some of the Iraqi ex-
patriots, now having returned from London to Iraq. Who do you think will
emerge as the leader?
Z: I don’t think that there will be just one. I think [Ayatollah Ali] Sistani will
need power from the Shi’ia. The Kurds, Bahaman, Taliban will split power.
The Sunnis need to find a leader that will come out of the Sunni center. What
you are going to need to have is a governing council of men and women that
the people and the real power players support. I don’t see Sistani going to
Baghdad and sitting on a governing council, but he’ll have to be satisfied and
that governing council will have to work that out. The actual structure, be it a
rotating council or a president nominally and a set of vice-presidents along
with some sort of legislature, will have to be decided. For democracy to work
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Albright said this was a war of choice. How does it affect our military
when our political leaders commit them to war in an area of the world
which is a hot spot, such as North Korea, South Korea, Kashmir,
Pakistan, and India?
Z: The senior leadership in the military who have a more geo-political view
would see the problems. Down the ranks they are basically focused on being
able to fight the country in wars and battles. Once they are thrown into it, their
basic assumption going in is that the decision was made by someone who
knows what they are doing and now they need to try to make this work on the
ground. It takes a long time for the troops in the ranks to begin to believe that
political mistakes are now costing us lives, more importantly, costing us lives
for no gain. In Vietnam, it took us years and years; we are certainly not there
yet in Iraq, although there are some cracks.
The senior leaders see it pretty quickly. The decision becomes how to handle
this. What do you do? You put your stars on the table and try quietly to
represent the troops, answer the questions honestly. It takes a while until it
filters down in the ranks. Everyone is going to want to be positive. I read the
Union-Tribune’s article on Bush’s speech. I don’t know what speech they
heard but I certainly didn’t come with that censored feeling that he answered
the mail. I heard him say that we’re going to stay the course. This course is
going to lead us over Niagara Falls! That’s not what the American people are
going to want to hear.
RW: Hadn’t Shinseki [former Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki] been
marginalized by this time? Were there any other high ranking active duty
officers stepping forward, either in Vietnam and Iraq?
Z: Do you remember General [John K.] Singlaub in Korea? He made one
mistake. He voiced his objection in uniform and didn’t do it within the system,
like in a ceremony. Then he was told that to do it he had to take his uniform
off and eventually he was fired.
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created that problem. When I was in Vietnam, we had all the tactics and
training, yet some things that we learned didn’t work on the battlefield. So I
said, “Why don’t some things pan out on the battlefield? Why did they tell me
to do this? It must have worked out in some historical aspect but now why
doesn’t it here? Maybe it’s not right for this conflict but maybe for another.
Since it doesn’t work here, what is the solution?” It came out as experience. If
you walk around accepting everything then you won’t be invited for that
second opportunity. We did this “Wisemen” business with the HDC and some
“Wisemen” were effective and some were not.
I talk a lot, especially with the ROTC students who ask, “Is this a calling,
profession, or a job?” If it isn’t a calling, you’re not going to be successful or
you’re going to be unhappy or you’re not going to be at the level you want to
get at. Most of this you’re going to have to seek out on your own. Students
come up to me and ask, “What’s the way?” There is no way. There is no career
pattern that you go through, certainly not business negotiation, mediation. It
is a tough business, so if you think you are going to be successful most of the
time, you’re going to be disappointed.
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in Iraq there needs to be a lot of autonomy in the regions. I could see the
Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi’ia regions with a tremendous amount of autonomy on
local, domestic, and internal issues with Baghdad more like a capital military
district with a different sort of mix. In terms of national security and foreign
policy, that stuff would be in Baghdad. There are some models for that kind
of diffusion of power, like the United Arab Emirates. There are some models
that have that kind of diffusion of power. It might be something like a
confederacy more than anything else.
JN: A lot of people join the military but don’t become generals. What
types of qualities helped you succeed in your career? 
Z: David Gherken once made an interesting comment about President
Bush—that one thing the President lacked was curiosity. I think you must have
a degree of curiosity or interest in whatever you want to do. If you are going
to be in the military, you have to want to delve into that profession. In my
generation, there were people that certainly wanted to become a Marine Corps
general, but, unlike some of us, didn’t have the curiosity, the depth of interest
that I saw. Some of my closest friends truly read, studied, discussed the
profession, were interested in the component parts and facets of the
profession and studied history. And then there were others who didn’t invest
that much interest; they were successful but didn’t have that depth of curiosity.
I have students that come up to me and say, “Gee, that really intrigues me.
How do you get there? Can you help me?” My response is, “How much do you
really want it?” Sometimes a student will come back and say, “Well, I went
online and pulled something online from the State Department and filled this
thing out.” Then, another student will have doggedly pursued the career
counselor, gone to Washington and visited different places, contacted NGOs.
Pretty soon she gets somewhere. Soon you get an e-mail saying, “I am now
working with this and I’m looking to work elsewhere.” It’s that sense of drive
and determination, that sense of curiosity that makes the difference.
I have always had an interest in solving problems; I wanted to understand what
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INTRODUCTION BY DR. JOYCE NEU, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR OF THE JOAN B. KROC INSTITUTE FOR
PEACE & JUSTICE
Good evening everyone, my name is
Joyce Neu and I am the Executive
Director of the Joan Kroc Institute
for Peace & Justice. It is a very
special honor this evening to have
General Tony Zinni as our special
distinguished lecturer, as actually the
last distinguished lecturer of the
2003-2004 academic year. The
Institute’s purpose is to foster peace,
cultivate justice, and create a safer
world, and General Zinni
exemplifies, I think, this mission.
We are honored to have him
speaking this evening on the topic of
“From the Battlefield to the
Negotiating Table: Preventing
Deadly Conflict.” Given especially
that we are a nation at war, we look
forward to hearing this talk by a remarkable person who has served his country
both as a military leader and as a diplomat. Coordination between the military
and civilians is critical if we are to more effectively prevent deadly conflict and
secure the peace. As I mentioned, this lecture marks the end of our 2003-
2004 theme of “Preventing Deadly Conflict.” Following the talk this evening,
General Zinni will be happy to take your questions.
General Zinni is the youngest of four children born to a family of Italian
immigrants in Philadelphia, and, in fact, if you listen carefully, you may still hear
a little Philadelphia in his accent. He attended Villanova University where he
received a Bachelor’s Degree in Economics. Upon graduation, General Zinni was
commissioned as an Infantry second lieutenant in the Marine Corps, following
in the footsteps of his father, who served in World War I. General Zinni once said
in an interview that he had never intended to have a long military career, but through
over three decades of service to this country, he distinguished himself through his
hands-on style and his lack of reticence in challenging conventional wisdom.
During the last three years of his career with the armed forces, General
Zinni was Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, responsible for U.S.
forces in a twenty-five-country region ranging from the Horn of Africa and
the Middle East to parts of the former Soviet Union. He joined the U.S.
Central Command in September 1996 as Deputy Commander-in-Chief.
Following Desert Storm, he served as the Chief of Staff and Deputy
Commanding General of Combined Task Force Private Comfort, a Kurdish
relief effort in Turkey and Iraq. In 1992 and 1993, General Zinni directed
Unified Task Force Somalia. During and previous to Operation Continue
Hope, he was Deputy Commanding General of the U.S. Marine Corps
Combat Development Command at Quantico, Virginia. General Zinni also
holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations, and in fact, I think we may
have some students here in International Relations tonight, and certainly we
have some students here in the Master’s program in Peace and Justice Studies.
He also holds a Master’s in Management and Supervision.
His many decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal
with oak leaf cluster, the Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leak
clusters, the Bronze Star Medal with Combat V and gold star, the Purple
Heart, the Meritorious Service Medal with gold star, and personal decorations
from South Vietnam, France, Italy, Egypt, Kuwait, Yemen, and Bahrain. He
has also received numerous civilian awards, including the Papal Gold Cross of
Honor, the Union League’s Abraham Lincoln Award, the Italic Studies
Institute’s Global Peace Award, and a number of others.
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Early in his career, General Zinni served in Vietnam, in what appears to
have been a transformative experience. He has said that his experience there
taught him the importance of developing an understanding of different
cultures, particularly non-western ones. This sensitivity to other cultures and
peoples comes through clearly in a book he is presently writing with Tom
Clancy entitled Battle Ready, to be published by Putnam. Since retiring from
the Marine Corps, General Zinni has effectively bridged the divide between
the military and diplomatic service by being named Special Envoy to the
Middle East by Secretary of State Colin Powell and has taken part in
diplomatic missions to a number of countries. General Zinni notes in this
soon-to-be-published book that when he retired, he had hoped to be able to
continue to be active and to make a contribution to peacemaking. He is doing
so today through work on conflicts in Aceh in Indonesia with the Henry
Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva, with the U.S. Institute
of Peace on the conflict in Mindanao in the Philippines and also working with
our neighbors at the University of California—their Institute for Global
Conflict and Cooperation on a project in the Middle East. When he is not
traveling, he teaches at William and Mary College. From a conversation with
him this afternoon, I must say that it seems quite evident that General Zinni
is very passionate about his teaching, has great care and consideration for his
students, and also great optimism for this new generation of college students.
General Zinni has been an outspoken critic of the war in Iraq and at a talk at
the Middle East Institute in Washington in October 2002, he said “It’s not
whether you’re greeted in the streets as a hero; it’s whether you’re still greeted
as a hero when you come back a year later.” It gives me great pleasure to
welcome retired General Anthony Zinni.
From the Battlefield
to the Negotiating Table:
Preventing Deadly
Conflict
General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (retired)
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Thank you. You know you’re getting old when the introduction lasts longer
than your career but I appreciate it, Joyce. I don’t want to leave you with the
idea that I suddenly retired and became a peacenik. My 39 years in the Marine
Corps was where we resolved some conflicts in the way we best knew how.
Some need to be resolved that way. After the Marine Corps, I learned to use
diplomacy, the art of mediation, negotiation, facilitation, and to try to solve
problems in that way. I’ve come to the conclusion that it’s like baseball; if you
bat .300 you’re in the Hall of Fame. So, I try to win one out of three and I
think that’s doing well. But, most importantly, I think in these efforts you find
that even in the negotiations that aren’t successful, you save a few lives along
the way, or you delay the conflict, or you create a situation where the conflict
isn’t as bad as it might have been. So any little bit that you do counts. It’s not
a game where the final score is the issue. In many cases, in the mediation
efforts I’ve participated in, we were pleased and thrilled to get an agreement,
only to find later that it couldn’t be implemented on the ground, and I’ll talk
a little bit tonight about the parts of all this and how they work, how the
military functions in all this, how we have to learn to cooperate with each
other and how we’re just discovering the tools we need.
I want to take you back to the beginning of the last decade of the last
century—about 1989, 1990. I had been assigned my first Brigadier General
assignment to the European Command in Stuttgart, Germany, and I had just
arrived there as the wall came down. And I would tell you that the place was
in a state of shock. This was a half century of Cold War—a military that
had grown with U.S. participation into the hundreds of thousands, a way of
life, careers that had known nothing but the Cold War. We had believed that
we could contain Communism, that Communism was flawed, innately
flawed, and it would collapse. And yet when it did, we were shocked. When
that wall came down, I happened to be in Berlin, and I was with a young
Army second lieutenant from the Berlin Brigade. He had a couple of us
generals with him and he was stuck with the job of escorting us around. And
he looked at us and he said “Let’s go on the other side of the wall to East
Berlin.” Of course, we said “Can we do that?” And like a second lieutenant
should, he said “I don’t know, let’s try.”
So we jumped in a van that he had and we drove through the now-
abandoned Checkpoint Charlie into the other side of Berlin, only to discover
that the main street was a façade. There were still pock-marks, bullet holes in
the buildings right off the main street. We drove into a Russian casern and
they were confused. They didn’t know whether to shoot us or kiss us or what.
And to all of us this was a shock. As we drove through there and as we stopped
and we talked to East Germans and Russian military people, we saw them in a
state of shock too. And for me, I was trying to come to grips with what this
all meant and what it would mean.
During my time there, President Bush had said, President Bush 41
[President George Herbert Walker Bush, the 41st President of the United
States], that this represented a new Europe, a new world order, and a peace
dividend on top of it. We watched as the military in Europe was reduced
drastically. In my time there, there was a massive reduction in force, the
wholesale disbanding of units. We had a remarkable Commander-in-Chief,
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe at the time, Jack Galvin, someone whom
we revered, an enlisted corpsman in the Second World War who made it up to
the position of Supreme Allied Commander, respected and admired and
honored by all those NATO forces, those who were fortunate to serve with him.
And he said, “I don’t think it’s going to be that clean.” And he believed that we
needed to do something to shape this post-Cold War period. He immediately
required us to go into the former Soviet Union and into Eastern Europe with
instructions to grab hold of the militaries there, the Russian military, the
militaries that were then fragmenting into different republics and the militaries
of Eastern European countries. Our job was to convince them that there was
...even in the negotiations that aren’t successful, you save a few
lives along the way, or you delay the conflict, or you create a
situation where the conflict isn’t as bad as it might have been...
It’s not a game where the final score is the issue.
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no victory here for our side, the victory was for their people, and to help them
understand how a military should function in a democracy, and to convince
them that they should be the models for that democracy.
We spent a lot of time working with these militaries. We spent a lot of
time sitting in conference rooms like this talking to them. We found that they
were as confused as we were. In one case, each of us NATO generals were to
present a talk on democratization and the military and what it meant. The first
general we had get up was a Dutch general who spoke about the importance of
unionizing your military in a democracy. Of course we grabbed him off the
stage right away and started to argue as the Russians looked at us and said,
“Well, what do we do? Do we unionize or not?” So we were more confused
about what to teach them.
Not long after that experience, the war in Iraq started. Saddam [Hussein]
invaded Kuwait. Obviously, that fantastic military we had created to deter the
Soviets or fight the Cold War if necessary in its last great act (I remember the
mighty Seventh Corps of the United States army that was in Europe was about
to be disbanded) went home via Iraq and managed the course that defeated
Saddam brilliantly. I went in after that, after the war was over and the confetti
and ticker tape parades were going on back here down Broadway and other
places in the country. We suddenly had to go back into northern Iraq because
there was this punishment of the Kurds that Saddam was inflicting. We got
involved in resettling the Kurds and trying to resolve what we saw as a
potential conflict that would last for quite a while.
In the meantime, Secretary of State [James] Baker decided that the former
Soviet Union wouldn’t repair and reconstruct on its own; we needed to help
them. And he decided that we needed was something akin to the Marshall
Plan; we needed to get the international community to participate.
Ambassador Rich Armitage, now Deputy Secretary of State, was assigned to
lead the effort. I was assigned as his military coordinator for support. We tried
mightily to go into this vast region of the former Soviet Union and help it
adjust to this new life, democracy, free market economy, political, economic,
social change. We did not get the support we needed. We did not get the
resources, the commitment by donors. The world believed that this was going
to be an automatic re-ordering, that we need do nothing but pull back our
defense spending and enjoy the fruits that we would gain from that and be able
to apply to other programs, other issues, other needs that we might have.
We couldn’t have been more wrong. In that decade of the 1990s we found
that out in Haiti, in Bosnia, in Kosovo. I was three times in Somalia. One leg after
another of these problems, such as Rwanda and Burundi, and it seemed like the
world was just coming apart. It was remarkable that in the bi-polar world, the
Soviets and we had managed to keep a lid on all this. So once that lid was lifted,
and the places that had been controlled by the pressures and investments from the
West and the East to make sure that things didn’t explode were released from that
control, all the ethnic hatreds, past rivalries, and the effects of poverty flared up.
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I remember during my time in Somalia looking at the amount of military
equipment that was in that country–Soviet MIGs, U.S. M-16s. We had both
bid on the country in the time that Somalia had changed sides and all it had
to show for its association with the West or the Soviet bloc was this collection
of weapons that permeated every inch of that country and caused problems
before and after the U.S. was there. Our military went through a tremendous
adjustment to this new world order. The pressure was on to reduce the size of
the military. The military was phasing down, losing structure, but not
changing; it was still a mini-Cold War military, not really adjusted to this new
environment. These constant missions that they were faced with included
peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, complex emergency operations.
The military desired to be the force that fought the nation’s wars. Military
leadership did not want to embrace, nor did they like, these other kinds of
missions. They felt these missions degraded their ability to carry out their
primary war-fighting role. They felt that these missions were not suited to the
training, education, equipment, and organization that they had. And besides,
they were going through the throes of this change which was very disorderly,
not programmed, not thought through. There was no vision for
transformation. There was reluctance among the old leadership to find
ourselves as peacekeepers or humanitarian workers, even though these were the
missions that kept getting thrown on our plate.
We did not work well with others out there. We found ourselves on these
new battlefields trying to deal with political problems, with humanitarian
problems, with economic reconstruction, with social problems. We found
ourselves, in many cases, at odds with non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), with the political representatives from regional or international
political bodies or from own diplomatic efforts.
We found ourselves trying to work in areas we had no experience in.
When I was in Somalia, I was made the chief of police of Mogadishu. I sat
on the judicial committee; I sat on the political committee for reconstructing
the country. Nothing in my infantry experience prepared me for that. I worked
and met everyday with the NGOs. And when that 20-year-old girl with that
“Save the Whales” t-shirt walked in and this 55-year-old general in his flack
jacket and helmet met her, there was automatic friction. She reminded me of
my daughter, I reminded her of her father; this wasn’t going to work out. We
could never bring ourselves to figure out how to make this work. We could
never find ourselves in the military accepting this mission. We even tried to
define what it was. We went through calling it everything from “small wars” to
“military operations other than war” to “stability operations.” We can’t even
define it, let alone give it the kind of attention we normally provide for these
sorts of missions, in doctrine and organization and material, in training and
education. We viewed it as sort of a dirty little additional job, to be done with
as quickly as possible. Never did we figure that this was going to become the
norm and this would be the kind of mission we would be faced with
throughout that decade and well into the 21st century.
I want to take you back a little bit in history to the end of the First World
War. At the end of the First World War, we had a visionary President Wilson
who saw if the conditions in the world that led to this war and the one previous
to that were not changed, we would repeat it. He saw the old ways the world
ordered itself as obsolete and part of the problem: colonialism and monarchies
that were unresponsive. And he wanted to change the world. Obviously, he was
branded an idealist and our country, which is basically isolationist, rejected his
idea to lead the effort to reshape Europe, to change the conditions in the world
that led to these problems. We were doomed to repeat the Second World War.
Remarkably, at the end of the Second World War, President Truman and
George Marshall, the Secretary of State, saw the same problem. But even in the
There was reluctance among the old leadership to find ourselves
as peacekeepers or humanitarian workers, even though these were
the missions that kept getting thrown on our plate.
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face of lack of popular support they decided that they would lead the effort
and we had the Marshall Plan, the European recovery plan. We had, for the
first time in our history, joined a major military alliance, NATO, and we were
actually the heart of forming it. We signed up the treaties and alliances that
changed the security structure in Europe and in the Far East. We aided in
changing economic systems and political systems in this part of the world.
And it once and for all rid this region of the world of the chronic problems
and structures that had led to the problems that we had had.
We are faced with the same problem now, in my mind. We have a region of
the world that stretches from North Africa to the Philippines, from Central Asia
to Central Africa, what we call the Islamic world, that is in turmoil, that is in need
of change, that is in need of understanding, that is in need of help, that is in need
of encouragement, that is in need of the rest of the world, the free world
community, assisting it and aiding it. Its problems are all known to us. They’re
called the war on terrorism, they’re called the Iraq war, it is what goes on in
Afghanistan, in Iran, it’s the Middle East peace process or lack of a peace process,
it’s the breaking of the relationships we had in the region and it is the lack of a
security structure. It is in desperate need of political reform and change,
economic reform and change, social reform and change. The region needs to have
an internal dialogue with its own religious beliefs, an Islamic dialogue to sort out
what the other Abrahamic religions had sorted out centuries ago. It is the part of
the world that if we don’t help it to change, we don’t encourage it to change, if
we don’t pressure it to change, we don’t assist it to change, then we are going to
go through the problems we have now well into this century.
We need to act like the Trumans and Marshalls. We need to step back and get
a strategic view. We need a grand strategy for dealing with this and by “we” I don’t
only mean the United States but the rest of the world. In this part of the world,
predominantly, is where we find the conflicts. These conflicts come out of ethnic
hatred, religious hatred, poverty, environmental degradation, all sorts of issues.
They are not religious. Religion is a rationale; it is a means to an end. It is the way
you take a young man or woman who is politically, economically, socially repressed
and give them the rationale to blow themselves up and to kill other innocents.
It costs us. I was looking the other day on the internet on the World
Bank website and they had some statistics that were interesting. Eighty
percent of the 20 poorest countries in the last 15 years have ended up in
civil war. Sixteen percent of the World Bank loans go to mitigating these
conflicts. And about 44% of these conflicts repeat themselves in 5 years;
they don’t get resolved even though there is assistance. We probably can go
through a list of lessons learned that would tell us how to better do things.
We’ve done that many times.
But it is really a question of will. Do we want to take on something that
may be as politically unpopular as President Truman did? The Marshall plan
had 19 percent popular support in the United States at the time and Truman’s
approval ratings had dropped in one year from 82 percent to around 20
percent when he made these decisions and made these moves. Talk about tough
hard decisions. But if we don’t change the world it will cost us more in the long
run. The issue, the political will, means that we have to get involved earlier. We
wait until it is a true catastrophe and we reject the idea of going in early when
we first sense there is a problem.
All of these issues and these conflicts can be broken down into three
phases. There is the pre-conflict phase, when you can sense the issues and the
problems, when we need to do a better job in gathering the intelligence of
knowing what’s brewing, when we could have some effect and maybe with the
work of institutes like the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice in
prevention. There is the conflict stage when we go in and have to mitigate and
resolve the issues. And then there is the post-conflict phase when we have to
monitor and maintain a stable situation and ensure that it doesn’t become one
of those countries that in five years relapses.
Now, we have been reluctant to jump in until the situation is so bad that
it requires a major effort, it requires military intervention and is beyond the
point that we can step back from violence; that’s been the issue. Before I
retired, I wrote down 20 lessons learned on my experiences in eight of these
operations. At the top, the very first one was “the earlier the intervention the
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easier it is to solve them.” Now, since retiring, I have discovered institutes like
the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, the Henry Dunant Centre, and
the U.S. Institute of Peace, political organizations at the international and
regional level, and NGOs which show potential for working in these areas,
bringing parties together, gathering aid and support and encouraging
resolution at the table as opposed to the battlefield. We need to invest in those.
Even after the conflict begins, we need to bring the professionals together.
Joyce and I were talking earlier about the lack of coordination we find all the
time. All those who join us on this unusual battlefield come as strangers to
each other: the NGOs, those that are responsible for political reconstruction,
those that are responsible for re-establishing the economy, those who’ve been
there trying to effect social change, and those wearing uniforms that are in
there trying to maintain security. They don’t work well together.
Believe me, the undercurrents coming out of Iraq are that the Coalition
Provisional Authority and the military do not have a good relationship. And
that’s been repeated almost everywhere else where we’ve had those kinds of
entities on the ground. We each see the mission differently. We come from
different cultures. We don’t train and work together. We don’t have a common
understanding of what we are trying to do. And that, in the end, causes us
these problems. We are now soul searching in Washington about the lack of
our ability to know when we are going to have problems, intelligence failures.
This is the area where we have intelligence failures by the dozens, where we
don’t foresee these conflicts. We don’t put enough emphasis on this. I
remember when Rwanda and Burundi flared up. The Secretary of State at the
time said the first thing they had to do at the Principals Meeting3 was to find
the map and figure out where Rwanda and Burundi were. I mean, we are in the
middle of genocide and we can’t even locate the problem.
If you listen to the testimony of the 9/11 Commission, one thing ought
to strike you—our government agencies don’t work well together. They only
come together at the very top. When you hear terms like Principals Committee
that means that only at the top, at the senior cabinet levels, can they bring it
together. I’ve been on working groups that were thrown together when a crisis
has reached its peak instead of before when we could actually have done
something about the crisis that would have been less costly.
During the Clinton administration, the President proposed a national
security strategy that emphasized multilateralism and engagement. It was
somewhat ill-defined. The Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen, actually put it
into the quadrennial defense review and assigned to us regional commanders
(in those days we were called commanders-in-chief but Secretary Rumsfeld
didn’t like that, too much power, so he’s removed that title) but the
commanders-in-chief were then ordered to shape, prepare, and respond. The
“prepare and respond” parts we knew. It had to do with the war fighting piece,
with the ability to be ready to take military action with our allies in the region
to protect our interests and our friends. We understood that. But this new word
came out, “shape.” What did “shape” mean? Basically, he left it to us to decide
what we needed to do from a military perspective to change the conditions in
our part of the world or help it improve. I took this and divided up my goals
and CENTCOM into three areas: one was the war fighting; second was the
day-to-day engagement that I had to conduct in the region; third was a new
category that none of my predecessors had which I called development. What
do I want this region to look like 10, 15 years from now and what can I do to
make it happen? What can I do to make the region more stable? 
I found myself involved in more than military efforts, as a matter of fact,
way beyond military responsibilities. PACOM, EUCOM, and SOUTHCOM4
were all doing the same things: taking charge, developing regional strategies,
working very closely with our diplomatic colleagues in the State Department
and others in trying to change the environment. There was one flaw in all this,
although I believe it was the correct view. The flaw was no resources. The
3 The Principals Meeting is a meeting of high-level administration officials.
4 U.S. Pacific Command, European Command, and Southern Command are some of the Unified Commands that have
control of U.S. combat forces in various regions of the world.
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Congress then did not believe in aid, did not believe in anything that looked
like aid and assistance, did not believe the military should step outside its
bounds of pure military activities, and did not fund the other agencies of
government like the State Department to pick that up.
So in the end we were developing strategies that did not acknowledge the
resources that were needed. As a matter of fact, we were required to prepare
something called the theater engagement plan and, in that theater
engagement plan, we were only to address the ends and ways, not the means.
We would not even identify where these resources might come from. What
might have been an investment, a small investment, to prevent conflict was
not made. So in the end, what you end up doing is paying much more dearly
once the conflict begins.
Even in just the area of the military you could do things to prevent
conflict. You can train militaries to handle problems before they get serious.
You can educate their leadership and train militaries to be responsible, to learn
how to function properly. We went on an effort on a skimpy budget to try to
help the Africans help themselves. Countries like Kenya had militaries that
were willing to work, like preventing humanitarian disasters, preventing
conflict, becoming more proficient at peacekeeping in its early stages. They
were willing to engage in humanitarian intervention before it became a
problem that erupted into something they couldn’t handle. They were
interested in changing the image of their militaries, becoming much more
responsible, becoming models for their own people. All this was possible with
minimal investment, yet we would not make the investment. Instead, we paid
for it later in interventions and wars.
I think we’re at a point now where we need to step back from all these
problems and we need to think of them as component parts of a larger issue. And
we need to develop that strategic view. And we need partners out there. I talked
to my friends in the Middle East who were discouraged since no one comes to
them and asks for their input. There is no formal process of consultation. They
are discouraged because the security structure they had before the Iraq war is now
gone. The troop presence out there has been changed. The unofficial alliances and
the understanding that we created with the countries in the region has now been
erased. They look to us to say, “What follows? What is the new arrangement?
Who do we fall in behind? How many troops are you going to have here?”
When we contained Saddam Hussein on a day-to-day basis in the entire
CENTCOM [Central Command] region, we were containing him with fewer
troops than the number of workers who work in the Pentagon every day. That
was the cost. We had countries in the region paying $300 - 500 million a year to
support our presence. We had countries in the region like Saudi Arabia that built
a $240 million housing complex for our troops. We had every country in the Gulf
Cooperation Council, including Egypt and Jordan that, every time we struck Iraq,
they took military action, supported us with bases, and over-flight rights.
We had countries in the region which went to war with us elsewhere.
Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait sent troops to join us
in Somalia. In the Balkans, we had troops from Jordan. Pakistanis paid the
price in Somalia for joining us with more killed and wounded than we had in
that conflict. Many of those things go unacknowledged but that involvement
is the result of building those alliances and working toward that prevention.
Now I spend a lot of my time in mediation, or facilitation, or negotiation,
or whatever you want to call it, and I have learned a whole new world of
techniques: how to build and improve capacities of the sides negotiating to
move them up to an even plane, how to put in third parties with different roles
(not only mediators but those who can stand above the process and provide
advice), how to bring in technicians who understand the art of negotiation and
who can help one side or the other.
What might have been an investment, a small investment, to
prevent conflict was not made. So in the end, what you end up
doing is paying much more dearly once the conflict begins.
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When I was in Indonesia working with the Free Aceh Movement and the
Government of Indonesia…imagine this…you have a government in Jakarta, the
negotiations are being done by a professional diplomat and a team under the
auspices of their leading minister, under the direction of the President, and the
Free Aceh Movement and the jungles of Sumatra have a small exile government in
Stockholm, Sweden. Many of them have day jobs. The Foreign Minister worked
at the post office in Stockholm and had to get a day off when we had negotiations.
Now bring them to the table. It’s uneven. The work you need to do is to improve
one side, to build the capacity to negotiate and to understand how the agreements
will be formed, implemented, monitored, and carried out, how complaints and
problems will be brought forth, how these things will be adjusted and handled in
the end, and how we take civil society and make sure they have a separate voice.
It’s too easy to say we have two sides and that each side speaks for their
people. How do you create the people as a separate entity at that table? Many
times I found in these negotiations that people say, “A pox on both your
houses. We are the ones that are suffering and we want a direct voice in these
negotiations.” The art of bringing them to the table is critically important,
empowering them and giving them a voice, especially elements of the
population that don’t normally have a voice: in many cases women, in many
cases minorities, in many cases ethnic groups or religious groups that have
been oppressed for years. How do you bring them in and legitimize them and
move them to a position at the table where they have a say and can be
confident in the outcome? This is the kind of work that is done by institutes
like the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, by the Henry Dunant
Centre, by the U.S. Institute of Peace and many other organizations around
the world. The investment in these organizations will pay richly in conflict
prevention and in conflict mitigation.
We learn lessons everyday on this. We learn that agreements themselves
can’t stand. I was involved for a year in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Believe
me, we could paper the walls of this room with all the agreements that had
been signed and agreed to and not ever carried out and implemented on the
ground, for whatever reason. Every one of these problems is unique, but after
we experience them, whether they work or don’t work, we add to our tool box.
We add to our own lessons, to our own techniques, and we learn again.
I would just close by saying, as a former military person, that we have to
come to grips with the world of the military. That’s probably the most
important issue we have now. Are we going to legitimize the military’s role in
this end of the business? If so, in this process of transformation, the military
needs elements and capabilities within it, the doctrine, the training, and the
organization to handle these responsibilities. If we are not going to legitimize
it, then are we going to put those functions somewhere else? 
What we ought to learn from Iraq is that when the State Department has
to deploy to the field, they don’t have a field force. They scrape the bottom of
every embassy to get 144 people. They put people out there who don’t know
the region, the culture, the language, the issues, who are not qualified for the
specific area that they are thrown into to run an oil ministry, to help
coordinate security or develop the police. We can’t have pick-up teams in this
business. It’s too complex and too difficult. Either the military is going to do
I have learned a whole new world of techniques: how to build and
improve capacities of the sides negotiating to move them up to an
even plane, how to put in third parties with different roles…how
to bring in technicians who understand the art of negotiation and
who can help one side or the other
It’s too easy to say we have two sides and that each side
speaks for their people. How do you create the people as a
separate entity at that table?
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it and we’re going to legitimize it or we’re going to have other agencies of
government do it and we’re going to have to give them the resources and the
capacity to develop the component parts they should provide—political,
economic, social—in addition to the military’s provision of security. Then
train them together, develop a strategy, develop what we need to understand
how we perform on this battlefield together. The third option is to keep doing
it the way we are and we will keep paying in blood and treasure if we do.
Thank you, I’ll be glad to take your questions.
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withdraw from Kargil. It was a long shot. He sent me because the only
connection we had with Pakistan (because of the sanctions we had imposed on
them) was the military-to-military friendship that I had maintained with
President Musharraf and his predecessor. When I got out there, Prime
Minister Sharif would not see me; he didn’t want to see a general. He said if
somebody is going to come see me it should be the Secretary of State or
somebody more senior. I had to send him a message that this was the best he
was going to get. General Musharraf saw me and I told General Musharraf
that the Prime Minister won’t see me but I need to convey a message from the
President and we’ve got to stop this before we end up in a bloody war that
could be a disaster. He said, “Give me ten minutes,” and ten minutes later I
was in to see Prime Minister Sharif.
What Sharif needed to back down and to stop this potential catastrophe was
some face-saving measure. What he needed was a meeting with the President
of the United States showing that that relationship may be coming back and
that he was listening to the concerns of the most powerful nation in the world,
which could help him with his own people and could help justify withdrawing
from the conflict. I was empowered to tell him the President would meet with
him if he demonstrated movement out of Kargil. We monitored him, of
course, from our satellites. When his forces began to move, President Clinton
immediately had Prime Minister Sharif to Blair House in Washington, met
with him, and they both announced the agreement that Pakistan would
withdraw. Tensions were reduced and we prevented a war.
Now, I’m going to tell you, on the thin thread of a personal relationship, we
were able to make that happen because we took a chance on a small effort.
Imagine formalizing that, imagine providing an institute that understands the
issues, understands the cultures, understands the methods that can be used in
these situations to help both sides come to agreement. It is a small investment
to make and I think what we’ve got to do is show those who determine where
our resources go how this can work. We need to legitimize this process and
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Neu: Thank you. I think all of our men and women in uniform and all of us
out of uniform, who have never been in uniform, can be very proud to have
someone of the caliber of General Zinni representing the U.S. and we’re glad
that he’s still doing so as an unofficial diplomat. In recognition of his
contributions this evening and our appreciation for him for coming to San
Diego, to the University of San Diego and the Institute for Peace & Justice,
we’d like to offer him a memento of the Institute. Thank you very much.
We will be happy to take some questions and answers. I will start with a
question while we collect some of the audience’s questions. You mentioned
that U.S. foreign aid has really not been dedicated to prevention and, since
our focus in this Distinguished Lecture Series has been preventing deadly
conflict, now that you’re more on the diplomatic side, do you have any
recommendations for what we can do to try to get more resources
dedicated to early warning and prevention?
Zinni: Obviously there’s a lot of competition for budget money. The Congress
supports the U.S. Institute of Peace for example. It was created by Congress
and funded by Congress. I think what Congress needs to understand and be
educated on is the value of investing in prevention. I think, on the other end,
we, those institutions that work on prevention (I include not the military but
institutes like the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, the U.S. Institute
of Peace and others) need to demonstrate what the investment could provide
and how effective it could be. It is amazing how many times we have stopped
conflict and we don’t even realize it.
During the 1988 build up between the Pakistanis and the Indians, they were
getting ready for the third World War, believe me. They had scared themselves
and it was like World War I where mobilization was on automatic and they
were about to go to war over the incursion into Kargil by the Pakistanis.
President Clinton sent me out to talk to [Pakistani] Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif and to General Pervez Musharraf to see if we could convince them to
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I think it was well intentioned but this idea of sequentialism in this narrow
path to peace or roadmap is the wrong way to go. Everybody knows what the
final status issues are. Everybody probably knows within a percentage or a mile
or two how they’re going to turn out. I think there are incentives that could be
put on the table by the outside world to help but several things have to happen.
One is that we have to stop the business of special envoys, high profile special
envoys that do “touch and go’s” out there. As soon as there’s a violent act or
something doesn’t go right, the envoy is pulled and another envoy comes in a
year later. We need a large delegation on the ground. It needs to be
international. It needs to work political, economic, social, and monitoring
issues all at the same time and it needs to stay there and have an address there.
It needs to try to light a thousand fires instead of one fuse which is very
narrow and can be very easily upset.
The second thing that has to happen is that the President of the United
States has to be directly involved. He can’t subcontract it out to the
Secretary of State or a special envoy or anybody else. Unfortunately, given
everything else the President has on his agenda, this has to be his. It takes
the clout and the power of the office of the President of the United States,
I think, to make these two parties negotiate in good faith and come to the
point where they have to make the kinds of compromises needed to live in
peace in the long term. The third thing that I think has to happen is that
the people have to become involved. I found myself walking the streets of
Tel Aviv or Ramallah and having people come up to me in tears, begging
me not to abandon them, not to leave them, to find some way they can live
in peace with the people on the other side, some kind of arrangement.
Sometimes I think the politics by the parties involved misses the point and
misses what the people want.
This Geneva Accord that was put together probably had a lot of flaws in it
but it had an idea of serving the people on both sides in a way they would
accept. The leadership on both sides did not like the idea. I liked the idea. I
think we ought to poll the Israeli people and the Palestinian people to see
what’s acceptable in the long term. It’s their peace.
internationalize it because, in many cases, the U.S. can’t work alone. There
needs to be an international component to this work; it shows the
international legitimacy of your effort and it shows the will of the
international community to want it to happen. Sometimes that’s face saving
enough for those who don’t really want to go to war but need some foundation
for telling their people that they’ve chosen another course.
Neu: We have a lot of questions that are coming in on Iraq so we’ll
try to group them together. But we’re going to start with the Middle
East, something easy (laughter). How would you advise President
Bush on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and what needs to be done
first, second, etc.?
Zinni: Well, I think what we have tried to do, but what has failed, is that we
have tried to return the two sides to where they were in the late 1990s during
the Camp David talks. Then they were at a point where they were putting the
final status issues on the table and they were working up possible solutions.
What we have tried to do is bring it back to that point by putting other
confidence-building arrangements in place first.
There was a feeling, as the Intifada grew and the violence grew and the so-
called cycle of violence continued, that we needed to take some steps first
before they got back to that table with the final status issues. So, Senator
Mitchell was sent out and he proposed the Mitchell Plan. The Mitchell Plan
was designed to take some confidence-building measures first before stepping
back into that final status negotiation. Both sides agreed to the Mitchell Plan
but it never got implemented. So we sent George Tenet out. George Tenet was
going to work on security issues and put together a security plan. The security
issues would be worked first, then we would go into the Mitchell Plan, then
we would go into the final status issues. Both sides agreed to the Tenet Plan
but nothing happened. Then Zinni was sent out. My mission was to get the
Tenet Plan into play. I made the mistake of putting the Zinni Plan on the
table, although I said I wouldn’t, and pretty soon come to the realization that
we’re moving backwards, not forwards.
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I heard one of our senior leaders say that he was shocked at how these
institutions just collapsed. Well hello, Saddam Hussein controlled them all.
You’re going to walk in and rip him out, de-Baathify, get rid of all the
Baathists, who knew how the trains run, right down to the lowest level. You
disband the army and tell anybody who is in business that if he is a Baathist
(which he had to be in order to do business before) he can’t do business
anymore. You’re going to bring in the exiles who had no credibility inside Iraq
and prop them up in the Governing Council. And then you wonder why the
institutions came apart? You’re going to go in there with insufficient troops to
freeze the situation, allowing the looting and the chaos. I am amazed that we
are surprised by the kidnappings today. There were 400 kidnappings of Iraqis
per day when the major fighting stopped; they’ve just switched the kidnapping
to other nationalities. It should not be a surprise.
I think what I would say to anyone who is dealing with this now that we have
two hopes left. One is named Ambassador Brahimi [UN Special Envoy
Lakhdar Brahimi] and he’s got to pull a rabbit out of the hat to save our
bacon. The other is the one I put my faith in…the Iraqi people. Despite all
this, they are going to realize that we are not providing any magic solution and
that they are going to have to do this themselves. That’s our last hope—that
they can pull this off. But we are going to be in there for a long time and we’ve
broken a lot of china in this part of the world, not to mention Europe and
other places where we’ve had allies.
Putting this back together gets more difficult everyday. There is a rule in
ditch-digging— when you find yourself in the hole, stop digging. The trouble
is that we keep making more mistakes. A 3000-man embassy in Baghdad?
I will leave with you one piece of advice that I got from a very wise man, the
wisest man I met in this whole process, Shimon Perez. When I first arrived
and met with him he said, “You will meet three kinds of people in this process
on both sides. You will meet the righteous,” he said. “Don’t waste your time.
You will meet the collectors of arguments; they want to win a debate on CNN.
Don’t waste your time.” And he said, “The vast majority of those poor people
out on those streets of Tel Aviv and Ramallah, focus on them.” And I think
that’s the third thing that has to happen in this process.
Neu: I’m going to start in with some of the questions on the current
situation in Iraq. One question has to do with the recent documentary,
The Fog of War, in which former Secretary Robert McNamara expressed
shock and surprise many years afterwards that the Vietnamese saw the
war as a revolution, not a fight against Communism. How do you think
the Iraqis see this war? 
Zinni: First of all, going back to Vietnam, since I spoke Vietnamese and I
wore the uniform of Vietnamese Marines and I lived in their villages, it didn’t
shock me when I was a second lieutenant. I am surprised that it shocked the
Secretary of Defense. You have to understand who the Iraqis are. They’ve
never known democracy. They have never known a free market economy. They
have never been able in their history, their recent history, to determine their
own fate. They got pooped out at the end of the Ottoman empire and along
comes Winston Churchill and Lawrence of Arabia who draw the boundaries
over dinner and immediately take the Hashemite king from the Hajj, who has
been ejected by King Abd al-Aziz, take him out of the Hijaz down in Mecca
Medina and make him the king of Iraq. And it has been downhill since then.
Now, all of the sudden, we come in and we say “We want to solve your
problems.” And they hear there’s going to be democracy. They’re going to
determine their own fate. There’s going to be jobs and a new economy.
Expectations were raised very high, very fast, as happens in these situations.
They were raised too high, too fast. I think there was a major underestimation
of the problems in Iraq and what reconstruction would take.
I put my faith in the Iraqi people. Despite all this,
they are going to realize that we are not providing any magic
solution and that they are going to have to do this themselves.
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my time there, the inspectors called it as they saw it and were honest in their
reporting so we got authorization from the UN to take military action and
use force when those inspectors were faced with noncompliance and no
cooperation. All we had to do was to wait for it. But what struck me this
time was that the State Department and our diplomacy was working on one
channel and our Department of Defense was going to war in March. The
State Department channel was going to take longer. The Defense
Department channel was going to war in March. All of the sudden, we were
there. It’s summertime; we have to attack. The only troops that train in the
summer in the Persian Gulf are Americans; I’ve got to tell you from
experience, so to me it was a bogus line.
Neu: We have an interesting question that just came in. If President Bush
were standing here, what would you tell him to do right now vis-à-vis Iraq?
Zinni: Well, I think I’d say the same thing. There is nothing magic to what has
to be done and it has all been said from the beginning. One, you’ve got to get
the UN involved; you’ve got to internationalize this as much as possible. Two,
you’ve got to get Iraqi security forces up and capable of handling the security
situation. We’ve taken too long, moved too slowly, and we haven’t equipped
and trained them properly. We disbanded the army, which was a big mistake.
You probably can’t call it back now but we need more effort put on the training
and development of Iraqi security forces. And the third thing is jobs, jobs,
jobs. If you want an Iraqi to fight and die for his country, give him something
to fight and die for. What he needs is a job, knowing that his family is secure,
and knowing that he has a voice in his governance.
Those are the things you have to do right from the beginning. But we wasted
a year and a half now. The economy is not where it should be. The jobs aren’t
on the street. Why aren’t Iraqis driving those trucks? That’s what I can’t
understand. It would mean more to them to be getting fuel through and
getting convoys through if they were sitting in the cab of that damn thing
instead of paying $180,000 to somebody from outside to come in and do it.
Why do we de-Baathify down to the point where we’ve lost the administrators
You’ve got to be out of your mind. Why do we want a 3000-man embassy in
Baghdad? We will still look like occupation forces. When we turn this over on
June 30th to we don’t know whom, what’s their responsibility? Will the people
of Iraq, the different groups, listen to them, abide by their rulings? What is
the role of our military? I have some simple questions like, “Who do all these
contractors answer to then?” If the 20,000 contractors that we subcontracted
to do this business out there are running around with guns and they shoot
somebody, whose court do they answer to? Ours or the Iraqi’s, once it is in
place? There are a lot of small issues like that that have to be dealt with.
Unfortunately, I think we’re going to run into a long stretch here without
much help from anybody else on the outside. Again, our two hopes are Brahimi
and the Iraqi people—that’s what it comes down to.
Neu: Thank you. From a graduate student of history we have, “How can the
U.S., as the perceived occupying force in Iraq, successfully transition into the
role of peace facilitator in a legitimate constitutional development process?
Zinni: By turning it over to UN and by figuring out what it would take
because the UN, being the other nations that make up the Security Council,
will take it on only if they have a say in the political reconstruction and the
economic reconstruction. If they are going to take it off our hands and oversee
this and contribute in sharing the burden, not only in terms of troops but also
in terms of what it’s going to take to reconstruct the country and resources,
then they have a right to have a say.
We should have let the UN process play out. The UN has always delivered the
authority to use force in the past. The first President Bush spent a lot of time
making sure he had that UN resolution in building a coalition before the first
Gulf War. It took time, it took Secretary Baker, it took Secretary Cheney, it
took Colin Powell running around the world constructing this thing and
making sure we had this thing in place. We had a remarkable turnout for the
first Gulf War. Secretary Powell, when he went to UN, pulled a 15-0 vote for
Resolution 1441 at the beginning of this. All we had to do was to let those
inspectors play out. Those UN inspectors have always delivered in the past. In
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I hate to keep [comparing Iraq] to Vietnam, but it’s an experience burned into
my soul. I remember living in a house in a village in Vietnam and an old
woman in that house said to me, “Why are you here?” And I said, “Well, to
protect democracy, to make you free.” She looked at me, shook her head, and
said, “If you want to help us, solve the problem,” and she pointed south,
towards Saigon. I said, “No, Hanoi,” and she said, “No, Saigon.” You can
whitewash all the schools you want but if you turn around and put a bad guy
into a governing council and [the people] don’t see that as representing their
interests, you’ve got a problem politically. If they can’t send their daughter to
that school you whitewashed because she gets kidnapped on the way unless
there are four males going with her armed to the teeth, then whitewashing that
school doesn’t matter. If father is home without a job, then that whitewashed
school doesn’t matter. It’s the relevance of the activities. That doesn’t mean
that those things don’t need to get done.
But what are the core issues that you have to change? What would be good
news? Good news is that unemployment is down. Good news is that they
feel good about who represents them in Baghdad and locally in their
government. Good news is that they can walk the streets at any time and feel
relatively secure. That’s what counts. If you can give them good news in
those areas, then I would criticize the media for not publishing it. But we
have to be careful as to what we say is good news that balances the bad.
Somebody’s got to tell me the good news this month that balances the 80
troops that we lost. I haven’t heard any yet and I sure as hell don’t want to
go through another month like this.
Neu: One of USD’s own, an alumnus who graduated in 2001, was killed
last week while on duty in Iraq. The USD community is very affected by
this as I think most communities are across the country. Next question:
Who is controlling the oil industry in Iraq and where is the supposedly $7
billion in revenues from the oil [that has been earned] since the invasion?
Zinni: I have no idea. [laughter]
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and businessmen we need to make things run? Just to make sure some of the
cronies that we brought in from outside could put their people in these places
and we buckled in to that pressure.
But the solution, again, is three parts: internationalize the problem, get the
security situation straight (we ought to be coming off the borders, we are
doing a lousy job of border security, we’ve got a Ho Chi Minh trail where the
jihadis are coming in), and make sure we’ve got something for the Iraqis to
fight for. Zogby [polling company Zogby International] took a poll in the
Arab world and what they ranked number one throughout the Arab world —
what they valued most, their main concern—was job security. What’s new? It’s
the same thing in Iraq as it is here!
Neu: This questioner says, “Twelve months ago I was in Iraq doing things like
purifying water, restoring electricity, clearing UXOs (unexploded ordinances)
from schools, etc. Talking to my peers that are there today, the same things
continue. What are your thoughts on the media’s sole focus on the limited
fighting instead of focusing on the good things that are going on?”
Zinni: I think we had the same problem in Vietnam because it’s what sells
newspapers. You can whitewash 80 schools [but] if you lose 15 troops that day,
guess which story is going to carry. The bad news always sells more newspapers,
always plays better on TV. But there’s a deeper question here. It’s not the issue of
how the media covers it; the issue is the relevance of the activity. It’s important to
build schools and clean-up textbooks and get them accurate, but if you aren’t
giving something on the other side to balance that, you run into a problem.
If you want an Iraqi to fight and die for his country,
give him something to fight and die for. What he needs is
a job, knowing that his family is secure, and knowing that
he has a voice in his governance
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For my students, when I teach national security issues, I give them about
three presidents’ National Securities Strategies to compare, Clinton, Bush,
and Bush 41 to compare, to see why the changes were there, what came about
and the rationale behind it.
President Bush 41 created a remarkable structure. When we fought the first
Gulf War, it was the first post-Cold War major conflict and, as I said before,
he went to the UN and got the cover, the authority, the legitimacy through
the UN to conduct operations and to use force. Then he built a very broad
coalition that became the model. It was used in Somalia; it was used in
Bosnia and elsewhere. Even if we subcontracted it out in a way, where we led
the coalition on the ground, we still used the UN resolution.
In the Clinton administration we tried to regionalize it more. If you look at
East Timor, the Australians led and we supported. We tried to do that in
Africa (again I go back to the point about the lack of resources provided) but
we wanted to train an African force and African NGOs to deal with their
problems so we didn’t have to put boots on the ground but we would provide
logistics, communications, intelligence, strategic lift, the wherewithal to get in
there and get things done. A lot of that failed, some of that hasn’t been carried
through, and certainly that isn’t the model now in the way we are doing
business in the Iraq war.
Neu: Some of us in the NGOs that you refer to and organizations like
the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice are in fact trying to deal
with groups that have been termed “terrorist organizations” by the U.S.
administration, such as the Maoists in Nepal, the Lord’s Resistance Army
in Uganda, you’re dealing with the Moro Islamic Front in Mindanao, and
the question is, “Is it possible to negotiate with these kinds of non-state
terrorist groups?”
Zinni: I think you have to pick and choose which ones you can negotiate
with. I don’t believe you can negotiate with terrorist groups but if you find
a group that is a separatist group or a group that is not a fanatical, radical,
60
Neu: Fair enough, an honest man. [laughter] I think this next question
must be from an undergraduate and, since you teach undergraduates, you
may have an answer for this. What are the top two or three books that
you would recommend to an undergraduate studying international
security and international relations?
Zinni: When people ask me questions like that about books I always want to
think about it to make sure I give them a good answer but, off the top of my
head, I would recommend books like Kissinger’s three-volume series on
diplomacy5 and there’s a professor from the University of Pennsylvania named
Karl von Vorys6 who wrote a history of American foreign policy that I would
recommend. But I think that those kinds of books, written by that level of
person, about the history of foreign policy and international relations, and
some of the more contemporary events that they describe and the thinking
behind them are important.
I would also advise going online and pulling down the National Security
Strategy and going to the State Department, Defense Department, and
Homeland Security websites and pulling down their counterparts to that.
Look at the performance plans in the State Department from each of their
sections and their embassies and, if the Defense Department ever gets around
to writing a national military strategy, which they haven’t in four years
although they are required to by law, it would be interesting to read those,
because supposedly that’s what our policy is. In a way, I think it’s been a little
bit unfair that preemption piece of President Bush’s National Security
Strategy has gotten a lot of focus but not some of the other pieces. The entire
strategy has been very narrowly interpreted with an emphasis on the most
controversial part but it is much broader.
I would also recommend that you go back and pull down the National
Security Strategies of past presidents, compare them and see the differences.
5 See Related Resources.
6 See Related Resources.
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push that into their agenda. To the credit of some governments, the
Philippines is an example, this trend has gotten their attention. So the time is
right to move in and make sure these groups don’t go over and get added to
that list of terrorist groups. Some of them that may have had some
association with terrorist groups obviously should be held accountable, but I
think they could be weaned away also. Again, it may have to be done through
private institutions that don’t threaten either the government or the group and
that don’t represent something that is difficult for them to deal with or
negotiate with as a third party.
Neu: You suggest a somewhat broader role for our military throughout
the world as a deterrent to further conflict but isn’t the U.S. military
presence causing a problem and is that not a primary motivation of the
so-called terrorists? 
Zinni: I think it depends on what kind of presence you have. Before the Gulf
War, our presence in the Persian Gulf was minimal. We had basically a naval
presence and, actually, that presence was appreciated when we re-flagged
tankers and did other things that helped ensure the flow of energy, which of
course is the driving part of the economies for most of those countries. I
think we have to think through our presence and measure it in a way so it has
the lowest visibility in sensitive places and, as the Foreign Minister of Qatar
once told me, put a human face on your military. He encouraged me to do
interviews on Al-Jazeera, which was pretty tough, but I did it because he said
the people have to see your average human face. On one of the first interviews
I did with Al-Jazeera, one of many, I had a question given to me about how
we take into account ethics and morality in military operations. I was able to
explain how we do that: how we have a system to look at everything from the
way we conduct operations, to our targeting; how that’s vetted; how we have a
staff judge advocate organization. I was even able to discuss chaplains in each
of our units. I was able to talk about our responsibility for morality: how we
do restricted target lists; what’s off limits; under what conditions we would act
against a protected target and why. The Al-Jazeera interlocutor, who is known
to be very aggressive, really was taken aback by a lot of that.
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extremist, terrorist organization but has had a long standing credible
complaint, negotiation may be possible. Let’s take the Moros and
Mindanao, because even President Arroyo of the Philippines recognizes
they have not been treated fairly along the way. In 1996, the Moro National
Liberation Front signed an agreement with the government and has been at
peace since then. The fulfillment of the agreement hasn’t been the best, but
it’s about a 50/50 deal. USAID [U.S. Agency for International
Development] has come in and really helped the process with what they’ve
done to help retrain the guerrillas, to give them a developing market for
their agricultural products, develop facilities, and give them skills and
training. They have something like a 96% rate since 1996 of guerrillas not
returning to the field.
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front is a splinter group who didn’t sign up
and is now willing to come to the table. Why is it important to negotiate with
them? Well, guess who was trying to get them on their side—Osama Bin
Laden and al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiya, Abu-Sayaf or one of their surrogates.
They are trying to radicalize these groups. They tried it with the Free Aceh
Movement when I was out there and others. They’re trying to tell these
groups, “Look, you don’t stand a prayer, join us, become more radical. Take
on the larger global cause.” Even though they happen to be Muslim, the
senior leadership of the groups in many cases does not want to do that and
they’re tugging against their membership because many of their members see
no relief in pursuing negotiations that fail or are not engaged in by the
government or are not encouraged and supported by those who can afford to
do it—the rest of the first world.
I think we need to pay attention to these groups. These groups have the
potential of being weaned away from radicalism and shown as models of how
they can succeed if they come to the peace table and have their issues
negotiated. Then other groups can see the rewards, like the work that USAID
is doing in Mindanao. It’s a small effort but if we don’t do it, this larger al-
Qaeda network is going to grow because they are casting out to some of these
groups who have not had a radical Islamic agenda. There’s an attempt now to
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So I think the point I’m making is to make it clear what your role is, keep your
forces to a minimum, have flexibility and emphasize the things that have high
pay-off. Look, we’ve had hundreds of thousands of troops sitting in Europe
now for 50-some years. Now we’re going to bring them back home. I think
there comes a time when you have to look at things like that and make the
adjustments. Should you keep them there? Are they necessary? In some places
they are; in some places they could be shaped or reconfigured in a different
way to be less visible, to improve their image or to contribute more on the
ground other than just being there.
Neu: The final question is how do you see the role of senior military
leaders in the political process of making policy before military forces are
sent into conflict? 
Zinni: The senior military leaders have an obligation to the President of the
United States and to the Congress to give them their best advice and opinion
on either the military mission or the application of the force. Remember
before the war when General Shinseki testified before Congress and gave his
honest opinion? When you get confirmed to be a chief of service or to be a
combatant commander in a Unified Combatant Command, the first question
from the Senate Armed Service Committee is, “Will you appear before this
committee and give us your honest opinion and view, even if it contradicts
the administration policy?” Well guess what? If you want that fourth star,
you’d better say yes and you’d better deliver when that time comes. It is
difficult but our senior military leaders must be confirmed by 100 senators,
all 100. If you want to be confirmed, you owe an obligation to them as a
representative of the American people to give them your honest view, even if
it contradicts administration policy.
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I didn’t expect the question but it gave me a great opportunity to explain that
we have built in those kinds of considerations that they may not have thought
of. I also think that sometimes we make the mistake of thinking that we can
do more with a greater presence but, in many cases, training the military of a
particular government is more valuable than having a battalion or brigade on
the ground. Putting in a training team and helping a small country develop
its border security or coast guard is extremely valuable and appreciated
because we are seen as contributing.
In many parts of the CENTCOM region, I think it was in eight or nine
countries, we had military people from all services assisting in clearing mines
left over from previous conflicts. We do humanitarian work. In my time, we ran
several humanitarian missions, one at the cost of $800,000 and a small
contingent of helicopters and troops—we saved three hundred thousand
Kenyan lives during the flood that cut them off from food. NGOs were there
with the food but couldn’t move it and it just took a small investment to do that
and move it, so automatically you put a better face on your military. The other
thing we did in CENTCOM was to refuse ever to consider what’s called the
Signed Forces. In U.S. Central Command there is no force structure like there
is in Europe and the Pacific. There are no military bases that belong to the
United States of America out there. They’re joint use spaces. All the forces that
come out there-—the combat forces, the ships, the battalions, the aircrafts, the
squadrons—all come from somewhere else on temporary duty. They could go
away. We never wanted to keep more forces than we absolutely needed for the
missions we had. In those days it was the enforcement of sanctions, UN
sanctions that were enforced under UN resolution, not U.S. sanctions.
...sometimes we make the mistake of thinking that we can do
more with a greater presence but, in many cases, training the
military of a particular government is more valuable than
having a battalion or brigade on the ground.
There comes a point in time when you may have to take off what’s
on your collar, put it on the table, and say, “Here’s the truth.”
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It’s tough because you answer to your boss, the secretary of your service or the
Secretary of Defense, depending on which position you hold, and then the
President of the United States. So you have a dual obligation but your
obligation is to speak the truth. I just spoke at the United States Naval
Academy and they allowed me to choose the topic. I chose the topic, “the
obligation to speak the truth.” There comes a point in time when you may
have to take off what’s on your collar, put it on the table, and say, “Here’s the
truth.” That’s what being an officer and a leader, especially a senior leader, is
all about. It’s not blind loyalty. It is an obligation to make sure that your best,
honest, professional opinion is given to those two places that you swore an
allegiance to. Our primary allegiance is of course to the Constitution of the
United States. If it means that the President of the United States and
Secretary of Defense no longer have faith in you, then so be it. You have to
leave. Our military only has two choices, either salute and follow the order or
put your stars on the table, walk away, and speak the truth. Either way, you
have to make a choice. I know which one I would choose. I would be long gone
in this administration; I’ll tell you that.
6968
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The Institute
conducts research on questions of conflict and cooperation of importance
for international peace and security, with the aim of contributing to an
understanding of the conditions for peaceful solutions of international
conflicts and for a stable peace. The annual Yearbook includes a discussion
of global military expenditures. Retrieved August 2004 from:
http://www.sipri.se 
United States Institute of Peace. An independent, nonpartisan federal
institution created by Congress to promote the prevention, management, and
peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Established in 1984, the
Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs,
including research grants, fellowships, professional training, education
programs from high school through graduate school, conferences and
workshops, library services, and publications. Retrieved August 2004 from:
http://www.usip.gov/
The Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan. The mission of the
DHS, as outlined in this document, is to lead the unified national effort to
secure America, prevent and deter terrorist attacks, protect against and
respond to threats and hazards to the nation, ensure safe and secure borders,
welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of
commerce. Retrieved August 2004 from:
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/theme_home1.jsp 
The U.S. National Security Strategy. The document details the strategies
used by the United States for security. Strategies include the strengthening of
alliances, working with others in regional issues, and preventing threat by
weapons of mass destruction. Retrieved August 2004 from:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html
RELATED RESOURCES
Disclaimer: The Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice takes no responsibility for
the content of the selected sites or publications, nor does inclusion imply endorsement of
the views presented.
WEBSITES:
The 9/11 Commission Final Report. The Commission’s Final Report
provides a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the
September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the
immediate response to the attacks. It also includes recommendations
designed to guard against future attacks. Retrieved August 2004 from:
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/
Henry Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue. An independent and
impartial organization, based in Geneva, Switzerland, dedicated to the
promotion of humanitarian principles, the prevention of conflict and the
alleviation of its effects through dialogue. Retrieved August 2004 from:
http://www.hdcentre.org/
International Alert (IA). A non-governmental organization based in the UK,
IA believes that the core of conflict transformation work is the building of
sustainable peace. The organization publishes articles on numerous aspects
of conflict transformation including the role of the military. Retrieved
August 2004 from: http://www.international-alert.org/ 
Jane’s Defense Weekly. This magazine provides factual and interpretative
articles on geopolitical threats, new weapons technology and military activity
across the world. Retrieved August 2004 from: http://jdw.janes.com
70
The U.S. State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. The Bureau
is the principal link between the Departments of State and Defense. The
Bureau provides policy direction in the areas of international security,
security assistance, military operations, post-conflict stabilization, and
defense trade. Retrieved August 2004 from: http://www.state.gov/t/pm/
University of California: Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation. An
institute that facilitates innovative, rigorous research into the causes of
international conflict and cooperation. Founded in 1983 as a research unit
serving the entire UC system, IGCC’s multi-campus structure allows it to
build research teams from all ten UC campuses and the UC-managed
Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories, providing broad-
based links to the U.S. and foreign governments, and policy institutes from
around the globe. Retrieved August 2004 from: http://www.igcc.ucsd.edu/
BOOKS AND ARTICLES:
Aall, Pamela, Lt. Col. Daniel Miltenberger, Thomas G. Weiss (2000). Guide
to IGOs, NGOs and the military in peace and relief operations. Washington, DC: U.S.
Institute of Peace Press.
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (CCPDC) (1997).
Preventing deadly conflict: Final report. New York, NY: Carnegie Corporation of
New York.
Clark, Wesley K. (2001). Waging modern war. New York, NY: Public Affairs.
Clancy, Tom, and Tony Zinni (2004). Battle ready. New York, NY: Putnam
Publishing Group.
Corson, William Randolph (1968). The Betrayal. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company.
Hampson, Fen Osler (1996). Nurturing peace: Why peace settlements succeed or fail.
Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.
Jennings, Ray Salvatore (2003). Military peacebuilding: Stability operations and the
strengthening of peace in war-torn societies. Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. Retrieved
August 2004 from: http://www.jha.ac/articles/a119.htm
Kissinger, Henry (1994). Diplomacy. New York, NY: Touchstone Press.
Lund, Michael S. (1996). Preventing violent conflicts: a strategy for preventive
diplomacy. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.
Stedman, Stephen (2002). Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Volkan, Vamik (1997). Bloodlines: From ethnic pride to ethnic terrorism. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.




takes its name from San Diego de Alcalá, a Franciscan brother who served as
the infirmarian at Alcalá de Henares, a monastery near Madrid, Spain. The
Spanish Renaissance architecture that characterizes the five-century old
University of Alcalá serves as the inspiration for the buildings on the USD
campus. The architecture was intended by the founders, Bishop Charles
Francis Buddy and Mother Rosalie Hill, to enhance the search for truth
through beauty and harmony. Recent additions, such as the state-of-art
Donald P. Shiley Center for Science and Technology, carry on that tradition.
A member of the prestigious Phi Beta Kappa, USD is ranked among the
nation’s top 100 universities. USD recognizes that rigorous academic challenge
is only part of a holistic education. At USD, students, faculty, and alumni are
encouraged to develop knowledge, values, and skills to enrich their lives and to
benefit their civic, global, and faith communities.
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Center for Character Education. Furthermore, through special campus events
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United States government officials as well as ambassadors from countries
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between candidates Bill Clinton and Bob Dole.
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the nation, is known as Alcalá Park. Like the city of San Diego, the campus
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